“National labor and employment law firm, Fisher & Phillips LLP, has named Todd Scherwin as partner in its Irvine, Calif. office. Scherwin’s practice area includes representing employers in various aspects of labor and employment law, including employment discrimination, harassment, leave law issues and many others.”

The federal judiciary was in mourning after learning of the death today of Chief District Judge John M. Roll of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Judge Roll was one of as many as six people believed killed at political event in Tucson. He was 63.

Flags will be lowered to half mast at many federal courthouses in memory of Judge Roll, who had his chambers in Tucson. He had been attending an event organized by Rep. Gabrielle Giffords of Tucson, who also was shot and critically wounded. As many as 16 more people were injured in the shooting.

“All of us in the Ninth Circuit court family were shocked and terribly saddened to learn today of the death of Chief District Judge John M. Roll. Our hearts go out to his family and to all of the families of those killed or injured in this senseless tragedy,” said Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

“Judge Roll was a widely respected jurist, a strong and able leader of his court, and a kind, courteous and sincere gentleman. He worked tirelessly to improve the delivery of justice to the people of Arizona. He was always upbeat, optimistic, enthusiastic and positive in his outlook. He touched many lives and will be sorely missed by all who knew him – colleagues, court staff, members of the bar.”

Ninth Circuit Judge Mary M. Schroeder of Phoenix, a former chief judge of the circuit, said Judge Roll was respected and love in both his professional and personal life. “He was famous for being able to say so many genuinely nice things about people without having to consult notes, for he so genuinely loved people and had such a remarkable mind,” Judge Schroeder said. “Judge Roll will be greatly missed and will continue to provide inspiration for the generations of lawyers and judges who were fortunate enough to know him.”

Judge Raner C. Collins of Tucson, who will assume the role of chief district judge for the Arizona court, said he and his colleagues were shocked and deeply saddened. “How do you explain such a senseless tragedy? Our hearts really go out to the family,” Judge Collins said. The Arizona court is authorized 13 judgeships and now has three vacancies.

Nominated by President George H.W. Bush, Judge Roll came onto the federal bench in 1991. He was elevated to chief judge in 2006. Under his leadership, the Arizona court has sought additional judges and other resources to better manage a growing caseload. One of two border courts in the Ninth Circuit, drug smuggling and illegal immigration predominate its criminal caseload. Born in Pittsburgh, Penn., Judge Roll received his B.A. in 1969 from the University of Arizona and J.D. in 1972 from the UA College of Law. He also received a LL.M. in 1990 from the University of Virginia School of Law. Prior to coming onto the federal bench, he had served as a judge of the Pima County Superior Court 1988 to 1991, and on the Arizona Court of Appeals, 1986 to 1987. He also had served as an assistant U.S. attorney for Arizona, 1980 to 1987, and as a deputy county attorney for Pima County, 1978 to 1979.

Judge Roll is survived by his wife, Maureen, three sons and five grandchildren.

Wendy McGuire Coats will be attending the oral arguments as part of the Ninth’s continuing coverage of the United States’ litigation challenging Arizona’s enforcement of SB 1070.

Over 250+ pages of briefing were filed in this appeal.  As a preview to oral arguments, below is a snapshot review of both parties’ major positions and arguments.

Summary of the Arizona’s Arguments: Here are links to the  Opening & Reply Brief

Arizona’s Issues Presented:

1. With respect to the district court’s finding that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims that sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 are facially preempted, the issues presented are:

a. Whether the United States can demonstrate that section 2(B) is facially preempted based on the potential that enforcement of section 2(B) could burden certain lawfully-present aliens or federal resources, even though section 2(B) merely asks Arizona’s law enforcement officers to exchange information with ICE that Congress has expressly required ICE to receive and provide.

b. Whether section 3 stands as an obstacle to the achievement of current congressional objectives by mandating compliance with two specific federal immigration registration laws.

c. Whether Congress’ decision not to impose sanctions on employees who perform unauthorized work reflects a “clear and manifest” intent to prohibit states from doing so.

d. Whether the warrantless arrest provision in section 6 can be facially preempted based on speculation that Arizona’s law enforcement officers might implement it in an unconstitutional manner.

2. With respect to the district court’s finding as to the non-merits factors, the sole issue presented is whether it is in the public interest to prohibit Arizona from acting consistently with congressional objectives to address “the rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human trafficking crimes, and serious public safety concerns” that the federal government has admittedly failed to address authoritatively.

Preemption Issue & Facial Challenge: The preemption issue largely addresses the district court’s conclusion section 2(B) requires law enforcement officers to determine the immigration status of every person arrested.

As to whether enforcement of section 2(B) would impose “an unacceptable burden on lawfully present aliens,” Arizona’s brief largely does not address the substance of the lawfully present alien argument.  Instead, Arizona focuses on the facial challenge made by the United States and standard requiring the United States to make a clear showing that under no set of facts could section 2(B) be constitutionally applied.  Arizona argues that the district court erred by basing its conclusion on a “potential” burden that section 2(B) could impose on lawfully-present aliens (examples include, asylum applicants, people with temporary protected status, or U and T non-immigrant visa applicants).

As to whether the enforcement of section 2(B) would increase the number of requests made by Arizona law enforcement officers for “determinations of immigration status” consequently diverting resources from the federal government’s other responsibilities and priorities, Arizona  argues that Congressional intent demonstrates and encourages assistance from state and local law enforcement officers in the enforcement of federal immigration law.   In this regard, Arizona argues that it cannot be impermissibly burdening the federal government when its conduct is welcomed.  Arizona argues that the United States has failed to demonstrate that section 2(B) will pose an obstacle to the US government’s federal agency accomplishing and executing the full purposes and objectives articulated by Congress.

As to whether section 2(B) requires that Arizona law enforcement officers determine the immigration status of every person arrested, Arizona argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted the second sentence of section 2(B) to mean that officers must determine the immigration status of every arrestee. Instead, Arizona argues that section 2(B) should be read in conjunction with the overall purpose of the statute and that officers are only required to determine the immigration of an arrestee where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is unlawfully present in the United States.

As to section 3, Arizona argues that this portion simply mandates compliance with federal law and therefore cannot stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives. 

Finally, addressing the district court’s reliance on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (available here), Arizona argues that central to the Supreme Court’s analysis in this 70 year-old case was the fact that the Pennsylvania statute imposed additional burdens not required by federal law, something not at issue here.

Writes Arizona:

Since Hines, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]o safeguard the rights of those who are lawfully present . . .[DHS] has developed rules restricting stop, interrogation, and arrest practices” under which “no one [can] be detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and . . . no one [can] be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,1044-45 (1984). (available here).

As to section 5(C), Arizona argues that the district court failed to apply the “presumption against preemption” approach and confused the concepts of field preemption and conflict preemption when it found that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) occupies the field of employment of illegal aliens.

Finally, as to section 6, Arizona argues that the district court simply erred because section 6 can be constitutionally applied and implemented.

Summary of the United State’s Arguments:  Link to the United States’ Answering Brief

The United States’ Issues Presented:

Whether the district court abused its discretion in preliminarily enjoining four provisions of an Arizona law that establish a nondiscretionary state immigration enforcement scheme that is not subject to the control or priorities of federal immigration authorities, and which

(1) makes it a state crime for an alien to violate provisions of federal law that require some aliens to complete and carry federal registration documentation;

(2) makes it a state crime for an unauthorized alien to seek or obtain employment;

(3) mandates all state and local officers to determine, as practicable, the immigration status of persons whom they stop or detain if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is an alien and unlawfully present in the United States, and to verify the immigration status of all persons arrested before they are released; and

(4) authorizes state officers to arrest without a warrant any person, including those who are lawfully present in the United States, when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has at some point committed an offense that makes the person removable from the United States.

From the United States Summary of Argument (pages 23 – 26):

The United States Constitution vests the authority to regulate immigration in this Nation in the federal government, and Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory framework to govern the eligibility for entry and admission of foreign nationals into the United States, the conditions under which they may remain and must register, sanctions for violations, and the procedures for their removal. Congress has also addressed the employment of unauthorized aliens as an integral part of the federal framework of immigration regulation, and has chosen to address the issue through employer sanctions and penalties on aliens who commit document fraud, and not through the imposition of criminal sanctions on aliens merely for working or seeking work.

 . . .

 Notwithstanding Arizona’s disagreement with the federal government’s priorities in the enforcement of the immigration laws, the State may not establish an independent state enforcement scheme outside federal control. The Constitution does not permit a patchwork of such state immigration schemes. A State does not have authority to supplement federal immigration law by criminalizing unlawful presence in the United States or attaching state-specific criminal penalties to the failure to carry federal registration papers, as Arizona has done in Section 3 of S.B. 1070. Nor does a State have the authority to criminalize attempts to work or performance of work by unauthorized aliens, as it has done in Section 5, particularly where, as here, Congress considered and deliberately rejected this very course as a matter of federal law.

. . .

By establishing a regime outside federal control, the Arizona scheme impairs the federal government’s conduct of foreign policy and its enforcement of the immigration laws. The significant adverse consequences for the conduct of United States foreign policy, described in the declaration of Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, are visited on the national government and the citizens of all the States. Similarly, by creating enforcement mandates independent of federal oversight, the statute prevents true cooperation by state and local officials with the federal officials responsible for enforcing federal law, and diverts federal resources to respond to Arizona’s “reasonable suspicion” inquiries.

Some of the big points:

As to the United State’s constitutional authority to exclusively regulate immigration, the United States writes:

The State fundamentally misunderstands the scope and nature of the States’ role under the Constitution in this context and the governing federal statutory framework. Congress has exclusive authority to set the penalties for violations of federal law.

As to  SB 1070 impermissibly conflicting with federal law and serving as an obstacle to federal immigration law and federal foreign policy, the United States writes:

S.B. 1070, in effect, makes unlawful presence in the United States a state crime by criminalizing violation of federal law regarding registration documents, mandating immigration status checks by law enforcement, and authorizing arrests of aliens who committed offenses that would make them removable. And S.B. 1070 makes it a crime for a person unlawfully in the country to seek or perform work. To ensure maximum enforcement of these provisions, and (purportedly) of federal law, the state law establishes a stringent, nondiscretionary enforcement regime, backed by a private right of action and severe penalties. Individually and in combination, these provisions substantially infringe on the exclusive federal regulation of immigration and the conditions placed on the presence of foreign nationals in the United States.

As to Section 3 creating a state crime for failure to register with the federal government, the United States writes:

[Section 3] is flatly at odds with the federal determination that mere unlawful presence in the United States should not generally subject an alien to criminal penalties, but rather is addressed through the process of removing the alien from the United States if federal officials determine that course is appropriate under the federal statutory scheme. It is “uniform” United States policy that “the unlawful presence of a foreign national, without more, ordinarily will not lead to that foreign national’s criminal arrest or incarceration, but instead to civil removal proceedings.” Steinberg Decl. ¶ 34.

As to Section creating a state crime for persons unlawfully in the United States to seek or obtain work, the United States writes:

Section 5 makes it a state crime for persons unlawfully present in the United States to work or seek work in Arizona. Congress, in contrast, has chosen to discourage illegal immigration through an escalating series of civil and, ultimately, criminal penalties under the INA only for employers who knowingly hire aliens who are not authorized to work. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. These provisions were designed to deter employers “from hiring unauthorized aliens,” which would, “in turn, . . . deter aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of employment.” H.R. Rep. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, 46 (1986). Congress thus has brought regulation of the employment of aliens within the INA’s framework for regulation of immigration — traditionally an area of exclusive federal, not state or local, authority.

As to section 2, the United States argues that “the issue here, however, is not whether a state officer may provide assistance to federal officials in their enforcement of federal immigration laws, or engage in the type of inquiry properly based on reasonable suspicion regarding unlawful immigration status.”  Instead, the United States notes that,  it singles out possible unlawful presence in the United States for investigation procedures accorded to no other type of violation, and removes investigation discretion to the extent possible except in cases in which determining immigration status is impracticable or “may hinder or obstruct an investigation.” The effect of the statute is not to induce cooperation with the federal officials responsible for enforcing the INA, but rather to remove discretion of state and local officers to consider federal priorities in their enforcement efforts.”

As to section 2′s purported burdens on lawfully present aliens, the United States writes:

Under Section 2, a person suspected of being unlawfully in the United States can establish a presumption of legality only with specified forms of identification, such as an Arizona driver’s license or non-operating identification license or Tribal identification. Persons with other forms of identification may not be able to satisfy this standard. Rather, bearers of other government-issued identification are entitled to a presumption of lawful presence only when the issuing State “requires proof of legal presence in the United States before issuance.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B)(4). On this basis, Arizona has instructed its officers to reject driver’s licenses from the neighboring state of New Mexico. Arizona Peace Officers Standards and Training Board, S.B. 1070 Public Information Center, Presumptive Identifications13; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-5- 9(B). Thus, a lawful U.S. resident — even a U.S. citizen — living in New Mexico, if pulled over in Arizona for speeding or a minor vehicle infraction, will not necessarily have a document sufficient to prevent a more involved inquiry into his or her immigration status and possible prolonged detention during that inquiry. See also Estrada Decl. ¶ 7 [ER 442] (discussing categories of aliens and citizens who likely will not be able to produce documentation necessary to avoid detention, such as minors).

And, if identification sufficient to create a presumption of lawful residence is unavailable, the United States writes:

[R]esolution of his status is not necessarily a short and simple process. Many U.S. citizens (who are not required to carry identification) do not appear in DHS immigration databases. Experience indicates that in such circumstances police officers “sometimes want to detain the suspected illegal alien (actually a U.S. citizen) until they can . . . confirm the subject’s immigration status.” See Palmatier Decl. ¶ 19 [ER 438-39]. Moreover, because the verification process may involve multiple databases, the initial DHS inquiry does not always resolve the status issue — last year, almost 10,000 requests from Arizona for immigration-status verification produced an indeterminate answer, which would require DHS to search additional databases and even paper files in an effort to resolve the inquiry. See id. ¶¶ 11, 19 [ER 435, 438]; Gentile Decl. ¶¶ 6–7 [SER 176-77].

And to the balance of harms and the public interest in favor of a preliminary injunction:

 Nothing in the district court’s injunction impairs the State’s ability to provide federal law enforcement agencies with assistance as provided by Congress. Congress did not invite the States to criminalize unlawful presence in the United States. It did not invite the States to criminalize attempts by persons unlawfully in the United States to seek work. It did not invite the States to develop a mandatory immigration status check regime outside federal control and without regard to federal immigration priorities and foreign policy. And it did not invite the States to authorize the warrantless arrests of aliens who have committed crimes in other States that may or may not support an order of removal.

Some thoughts and predictions . . .

The standard for determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue was recently addressed in the Supreme Court’s decision in Winters and was the standard stated and applied by Judge Bolton in her order.  In reviewing the preliminary injunction order, the Ninth Circuit will apply the following standard of review:

As recently articulated by the Supreme Court, a “plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.) 2009) (citing Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)).  A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact.  Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Am. Trucking, 559 F.3d at 1052).  Thus, application of an incorrect legal standard in granting preliminary injunctive relief or with regard to an underlying issue is grounds for reversal.  See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

And again, for those who lose sight of the procedural posture of this appeal, the Ninth Circuit is not reviewing whether the “underlying substantive questions” (the constitutionality of AZ’s law or the preemption issues) were determined correctly, because the parties have not fully briefed those (even if it feels like it) and the district court has not ruled on those issues yet.  Instead, this is simply a question of whether it United States appears likely to succeed on the merits and whether the balance of harm weighs in favor of enjoining enforcement of SB 1070 while the courts resolve the substantive issues.  Remember, the standards is an abuse of discretion.  If the Judge Bolton used the wrong law or got the law wrong  that can be reviewed de novo, but if the court is right on the law, then it’s the high standard of abuse of discretion.  And Arizona’s arguments don’t really assert that Judge Bolton used the wrong law.  Arizona tends to argue that Judge Bolton’s interpretation of the law is incorrect, which could be a de novo review.  But, even if that case, the Ninth Circuit could take the opportunity to clarify “how” the law should be interpreted by Judge Bolton during the substantive litigation and still keep the preliminary injunction in place.  I anticipate that the preliminary injunction will be affirmed.

Here, the briefs read quite a bit like the arguments that will be made during the substantive briefing and argument phases before the district court, but all observers must remember this is just an appeal on the issue of whether the preliminary injunction was properly issued.  Regardless of the other issues briefed and discussed by the parties, the Ninth Circuit will likely tailor its decision to this single question.  I anticipate that it will save for another day the substantive issues, when they have been properly determined by the district court.   But, this doesn’t stop the Ninth Circuit from issuing some guidance as to how Judge Bolton should proceed going forward.

In addition to its decision, oral argument presents t the Ninth Circuit an interesting opportunity to address some of the Court’s concerns with the constitutional determinations regarding SB 1070 by way of the questions it poses to counsel.  Oral argument could provide both sides an opportunity to learn of and shore up potential appellate concerns by further developing the record below.  The questions posed and discussed at oral argument will also serve to telegraph to Judge Bolton where potential concerns lurk giving her an opportunity to tweak and bolster  the opinion she will issue on the substantive issues later in the case and avoid a reversal.  Even if the questions from the bench do not go directly to the appropriateness of the preliminary injunctions issuance, you can be sure that everyone will be paying attention and considering how the bench’s responses and questions should impact the current proceedings in the district court.  

Calendared  for Monday October 4, 2010

Jason M. Ransom, Petitioner  v. MBNA, America Bank, N.A., Case No. 09-907

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,  Case No. 08-15066 Decision Date: August 14, 2009 Ninth Circuit opinion available here.

Questions Presented:

Whether, in calculating the debtor’s “projected disposable income” during the plan period, the bankruptcy court may allow an ownership cost deduction for vehicles only if the debtor is actually making payments on the vehicles.

Calendared for Tuesday October 5, 2010

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, et al., Petitioners  v.  Robert M. Nelson, et al., Case. No. 09-530

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No.: 07-56424  Decision Date: June 20, 2008 

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the government violates a federal contract employee’s constitutional right to informational privacy when it asks in the course of a background investigation whether the employee has received counseling or treatment for illegal drug use that has occurred within the past year, and the employee’s response is used only for employment purposes and is protected under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.

 2. Whether the government violates a federal contract employee’s constitutional right to informational privacy when it asks the employee’s designated references for any adverse information that may have a bearing on the employee’s suitability for employment at a federal facility, the reference’s response is used only for employment purposes, and the information obtained is protected under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.

 Los Angeles County, California, Petitioner  v.  Craig Arthur Humphries, et ux., Case No. 09-350

 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 05-56467 Decision Date: June 22, 2009    

Questions Presented:

1. Are claims for declaratory relief against a local public entity subject to the requirement of Monellv. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) that the plaintiff demonstrate that the constitutionalviolation was the result of a policy, custom or practice attributable to the local public entity as determined by the First, Second, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, or are such claims exempt from Monell’s requirement as determined by the Ninth Circuit?

2. May a plaintiff be a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. §1988 for purposes of a fee award against a local public entity based upon a claim for declaratory relief where the plaintiff has not demonstrated that any constitutional violation was the result of a policy, custom or practice attributable to the public entity under Monell?

3. May a plaintiff be a prevailing party on a claim for declaratory relief for purposes of a fee award under 42 U.S.C. §1988 where there is neither a formal order nor judgment granting declaratory relief, nor any other order altering the legal relationship between the parties in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff?

 Calendared for Tuesday October 12, 2010

 Kelly Harrington, Warden, Petitioner v. Joshua Richter, Case No. 09-587

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,  Case No. 06-15614 Decision Date: August 10, 2009

Questions Presented:

In granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, did the Ninth Circuit deny the state court judgment the deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) and impermissibly enlarge the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by elevating the value of expert-opinion testimony in a manner that would virtually always require defense counsel to produce such testimony rather than allowing him to rely instead on cross-examination or other methods designed to create reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt?

IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: DOES AEDPA DEFERENCE APPLY TO A STATE COURT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF A CLAIM, INCLUDING A CLAIM UNDER Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Petitioner  v. Randy Joseph Moore,  Case No. 09-658

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 04-15713 Decision Date: July 28, 2009  Ninth Circuit opinion available here.

Questions Presented:

1. This Court established in Hill v. Lockhartthe standard for assessing, in a collateral challenge to a conviction that was based on a guilty or no-contest plea, whether an attorney’s deficient performance requires reversal of a conviction. In Arizona v. Fulminante-a direct appellate review case-this Court reviewed all the evidence presented at trial and held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession at the trial was not harmless.

a. If a collateral challenge is based on a defense attorney’s decision not to move to suppress a confession prior to a guilty or no contest plea, does the Fulminantestandard apply, even though no record of a trial is available for review?

 b. Even if the Fulminante standard applies in that context, is it “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?

 2. In Moore’s underlying criminalcase, he confessed to police that he personally shot the victim. He also confessed to two other people, and he ultimately pleaded no contest to murder. In his collateralchallenge to his conviction, he alleged that his attorney should have moved to suppress the confession to police, but he offered no evidence that he would have insisted on going to trialhad counsel done so. Did the Ninth Circuit err by granting federal habeas relief on Moore’s ineffective-assistance of-counsel claim?

Though the immigration law has been riddled with constitutional problems and allegations that it will lead to racial profiling, the Arizona legislature plans on moving forward this week with a new bill that would require police to arrest people who look like they didn’t file their federal tax returns this year.  While there is no guidance given on who “looks like” they didn’t file their tax returns this year, one Arizona lawman was quoted as saying, “Well, dark skin is the first giveaway.  Lack of proficient English is the second.  Beyond that, white people showing any sign of disposable income.”  Civil rights organizations are already rallying.

When asked why Arizona has decided to enforce not only its own laws but federal ones as well, one official said, “People who violate laws are likely to violate other laws.  In my book, you break one, you break ‘em all.”

Rumors have begun to swirl about other upcoming bills requiring local law enforcement to make federal arrests, including people who look like they made an illegal stock trade today, people who look like they are violating a patent, and people who look like they have ever tried to interfere with the U.S. railroad system.

Three regular contributors include:

Emily K. Allen, a founding partner of The Allen Butler Group, LLP who will focus on cases and issues involving immigration and the immigration consequences of criminal convictions.

Stevie E. Leahy, a pro-bono attorney working with Volunteer Lawyers Project of the Boston Bar Association, a non-profit organization providing free civil litigation assistance to low-income families who will focus on cases and issues involving gay marriage, the First Amendment, the internet, human rights, white collar and securities litigation.

Sharla A. Manley,  a staff attorney with the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, the only non-profit, public interest law firm in the state of Hawai`i that provides legal assistance to families and communities engaged in perpetuating the culture and traditions of Hawai`i’s indigenous people.  Sharla follows cases and trends affecting indigenous peoples and the environmental resources upon which cultural practices depend.

The “Think Tank” will host commentary and analysis on recent decisions, game-changing cases, and developing trends covering a wide array of legal issues.  The “Paper Trail” will host recent orders and opinions issued from the Ninth Circuit.  “SCOTUS” will follow recent outcomes of Ninth Circuit cert. petitions and cases on review to the U.S. Supreme Court.  “The Judges” will feature judicial profiles of Ninth Circuit judges, including advice and suggestions garnered from interviews with former clerks, externs, and practitioners appearing before the court.e Ninth is poised to become a one-stop-shop for breaking news on recent cases and opinions, considered discussion, and resources related to practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.